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PREDICTABILITY OF ARBITRATORS’
RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY?
ARIANA R. LEVINSON, ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR, PAIGE MARTA SKIBA*
ABSTRACT
Should arbitrators consider authority—such as statutes or case law—external
to the collective bargaining agreement when deciding labor grievances? Do they
rely on such external authority? If so, do they do so in particular circumstances
or in certain types of cases? To provide more insight on this often-debated issue,
we have amassed a new data set of hundreds of labor arbitration awards
spanning a decade. In contrast to previous research, we find that the
overwhelming majority of awards do not cite to any external authority (statutes,
administrative authorities, case law, or secondary sources). Yet, only a small
fraction of awards explicitly decline to address a statutory issue or do not address
external authority cited by one of the parties and mentioned in the award. Other
significant findings: one or both parties being represented by an attorney in the
arbitration hearing correlates with citation to external authority. Instances
where arbitrators are drawn from the American Arbitration Association or the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service rosters result in a greater likelihood
of citation to authority than when arbitrators are selected without aid of a service
provider. Awards addressing claims asserting a breach of a just-cause provision
are more likely than other types of contractual claims to cite to external authority.
* Ariana R. Levinson is a Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of
Louisville Brandeis School of Law. Erin O’Hara O’Connor is Dean and McKenzie
Professor at Florida State University College of Law. Paige Marta Skiba, PhD, is a Professor
of Law at Vanderbilt Law School. We thank Carlie Malone and Sam Miller for
performing the statistical analyses for this article and each student research assistant
who worked on this project either coding awards or researching the arbitration
literature. We also thank the Law Schools at which we work for funding this research
and providing IT support, Steve Ware for providing feedback on an initial draft, and
the participants who provided feedback at the Université Paris Nanterre, Law and
Economics Workshop, and the faculty workshops at University of Louisville Brandeis
School of Law and the University of Cincinnati College of Law.
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Our new data set differs from prior data sets in that it includes published and
unpublished awards and cases decided by industrial boards, enabling broader
study of differing types of labor arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
Should arbitrators consider external authority when deciding labor
grievances? Do they rely on external authority? If so, do they do so in
particular circumstances or in certain types of cases? We have amassed
a new data set of labor arbitration awards to help answer these
questions. This article reports our findings about whether labor
arbitration awards from 2000 to 2011 cite to external authority. While
empirical data cannot, without inference, answer the question of
whether labor arbitrators should consider external authority, it can
shed light on whether they do consider external authority.
Empirical examination can also reveal the factors that enhance the
likelihood that arbitration awards will cite to external authority. For
example, perhaps citation to external authority is more likely in cases
where parties are represented by attorneys than when they are not, or
when arbitration is conducted by an arbitrator selected via a third-party
service provider (service provider) rather than an ad hoc arbitrator
selection process. And perhaps some types of disputes (e.g., statutory
claims) are more likely to be resolved using external authority than are
others (e.g., disputes involving the meaning of contract terms).
When arbitrators ignore external legal authority, outsiders charge
that this private dispute resolution is lawless. Christopher Drahozal has
empirically explored the question of whether arbitrators follow the
law.1 He explores empirical studies of arbitration awards, including of
labor arbitration awards; surveys of arbitrators; and reversal rates to
conclude that “[o]verall, the evidence on whether arbitrators follow
the law in their awards is inconclusive.”2 Citation to external authority,
such as statutes, cases, and administrative regulations, that we generally
consider to be law, is one point of information to help answer the
question.3
Why care whether or not arbitrators cite legal authority or whether
arbitration is lawless? Over the decades more and more disputes are
decided outside of court through alternative dispute resolution,
including through arbitration. In many settings, an aggrieved individual
1. Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 189–
90 (2006).
2. Id. at 194, 203.
3. See id. at 195–96 (relying on a study that reviews citation practices to assess
whether arbitrators follow the law). We focus in this Article on whether arbitrators cite
external authority, statutes, cases, administrative regulations, and secondary sources,
which state the law. A later article will address the issue of whether arbitrators cite
arbitration awards, which may or may not be considered law.
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or group may never be able to file suit, but must seek relief through
arbitration instead.4 Many adhesion contracts, and contracts between
more equal parties, contain arbitration clauses,5 and the Supreme
Court has mandated the enforcement of arbitration clauses in a broad
variety of contexts.6 Some argue that this is a positive development
favoring low-cost, efficient resolution of disputes,7 while others argue
that claimants in some types of arbitration are deprived of necessary due
process.8 Lawlessness is a concern because it suggests that arbitration
can be used to circumvent legal protections designed to aid one of the
parties or to further public policy.9
Building on Drahozal’s work, Mark Weidemaier’s 2012 article
explores four different types of arbitration, including labor arbitration,
to determine that “the evidence provides little support for the view that
arbitrators and judges engage in qualitatively different kinds of
decision-making or opinion-writing.”10 Nearly half of the labor awards
in Weidemaier’s study cite to a judicial opinion or arbitration award
and, although only 14.9% cite only to judicial opinions, a higher
4. STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R. LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW 3–4
(2017).
5. Id. at 3–4; FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW
544, 562–63 (2d ed. 2010).
6. FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 551; see, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (upholding clause barring classwide arbitration); Doctor’s
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (upholding arbitration clause
under federal law in light of state-law challenge); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–69, 282 (1995) (upholding arbitration clause under the
Federal Arbitration Act’s interstate commerce provision); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (subjecting age discrimination claim to mandatory
arbitration clause); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) (upholding clause on arbitrating statutory claims); Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“[A]s a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration . . . .”).
7. See David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1578
(2005).
8. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830 (2009) (discussing how arbitration disproportionately
benefits defendants); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87
IND. L.J. 239, 241–42 (2012) (asserting that through removing process costs, primarily
by limiting discovery, arbitration promotes claim suppression).
9. See Drahozal, supra note 1, at 190.
10. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2012).
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percentage cite to both judicial opinions and arbitral awards.11 His
study also found that labor arbitration may form its own system of
precedent. Specifically, “[l]abor arbitrators cite past awards more
frequently, and in greater numbers, than arbitrators in the other
regimes, and labor arbitrators often justify their decisions by citing only
other arbitration awards.”12 Thus, his study suggests that while all
arbitrators generally follow the law expressed in judicial opinions, labor
arbitrators are more likely to consider arbitral awards than judicial
decisions.
There is a long-standing debate in the labor arbitration field about
whether arbitrators should rely on legal authority.13 Consistent with
already articulated concerns about lawlessness, some scholars have
argued that labor arbitrators have a duty to consider and follow
external authority and to render decisions that are consistent with the
law.14 At the same time, other preeminent labor arbitrators have long
argued that arbitrators should not consider authority external to the
governing contract (i.e., the collective bargaining agreement),
especially when external authority conflicts with the mandate of the
contract.15 In the labor arbitration community, this debate is known as
the Howlett-Meltzer debate, after the two arbitrators who initially
presented the cogent arguments on each side in 1967.16 In the years since,
scholars have articulated refined positions, and some have argued that
the rise in employment laws has made citation to external authority in
labor arbitration awards unavoidable.17

11. Id. at 1111, 1114 fig.2, 1145 tbl.A-1.
12. Id. at 1095.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See, e.g., Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in NAT’L
ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING 67, 78–79 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967) (stating that
arbitrators should decide on statutory issues where relevant instead of being bound by
the four corners of the contract).
15. See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor
Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 557 (1967) (stating that an arbitrator commenting
on requirements of enacted legislation would exceed the scope of his duties).
16. See Philip Baldwin, The External Debate on External Law in Labor Arbitration: Where
We Stand Five Decades After Meltzer v. Howlett, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 31, 31 (2016);
Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Public Law in Labor
Arbitration: Is It Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. LAW. 1, 5 (2008).
17. See Dennis R. Nolan, Disputatio: “Creeping Legalism” as a Declension Myth, 2010
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (arguing that the “enormous outpouring” of post-Civil Rights Act
employment legislation made it nearly impossible to avoid conflicts between contracts
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Empirical study of labor arbitration like ours can offer a starting
point for proposals about whether and how to modify other types of
arbitration, such as securities or employment arbitration, to ensure
that the law is considered and followed when statutory claims or
common law claims are at issue. For instance, if, as our data indicates,
labor arbitrators consider external law more often when attorneys
represent the parties, then representation could be legislatively
required in other settings. If, as after some sifting of our data indicates,
labor arbitrators cite external authority more often for statutory claims,
examination of external authority and written reasoning could be
required for those claims.
Before setting out our detailed empirical findings, we provide
background about labor arbitration in Part I. In Part II, we set out the
problem arbitrators face of whether to consider external law, detail the
debate over whether they should, and report on the few other empirical
studies of citation to external authority. In Part III, we describe our
research question and methodology, and then report our empirical
findings in Part IV before concluding.
I. BACKGROUND
Labor arbitration in the U.S. has a long history, and recent calls to
prohibit mandatory adhesive arbitration have generally excluded labor
arbitration. This Part briefly explains the history of labor arbitration, the
process of the grievance arbitration system, the types of written awards
in labor arbitration, and the perception of fairness of their results.
A. History of Labor Arbitration
Labor arbitration was used by employers and unions to resolve
disputes about the meaning of their collective bargaining agreements
long before the more recent rise in arbitration of statutory employment
law claims. As early as the 1880s, labor arbitration “was familiar
enough . . . to be recognized in the laws of a number of states.”18 The
state laws “simply authorized the courts to appoint local boards of
arbitration upon the joint request of employers and employees.”19 The
form of labor arbitration common today, where a neutral umpire decides
and external law); Malin, supra note 16, at 15 (stating that arbitrators cannot avoid
considering the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)).
18. DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN
A NUTSHELL 5 (3d ed. 2017).
19. Id.
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the dispute, “was routine in the unionized sector of the American
economy”20 by 1940, when General Motors and the United Automobile
Workers “substantially revised their arbitration procedure.”21 Arbitration
often substituted for strikes as a way to resolve workplace disputes,
leading to less of a breakdown in commerce,22 and also substituted for
lawsuits over contractual claims.23
When employees choose union representation, the union is
authorized to bargain with the employer over the terms and conditions
of employment.24 The parties negotiate a contract that covers
workplace issues such as pay, schedules, attendance, leave, benefits,
and non-discrimination.25 The contract is known as a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA).26 Most CBAs contain a clause that
guarantees that discipline, including discharge, will be only for a just
cause.27 Because outside of the union setting most employees are
employed at will and can be discharged for any reason or no reason at
all, just cause is a significant contractual protection for unionrepresented employees.28 Labor arbitrators have been settling disputes
over workplace grievances and the interpretation of CBAs for hundreds
of years as part of a grievance-arbitration system in unionized workplaces.
B. The Grievance Arbitration System
Most CBAs also include a grievance arbitration provision.29 The
grievance arbitration process is typically designed to resolve workplace

20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5–6 (noting that Louis Brandeis helped negotiate an agreement to end a
garment industry strike in 1910 and chaired the resultant Board of Arbitration for a
decade thereafter).
23. Robert G. Howlett, The Role of Law in Arbitration: A Reprise, in NAT’L ACAD. OF
ARBITRATORS, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 64, 68–69 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1968) (quoting
Clyde W. Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public Function, 34 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 477, 494 (1965)).
24. DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 155 (3d ed. 2011).
25. Id. at 183.
26. NOLAN & BALES, supra note 18, at 1.
27. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 218.
28. See RAY ET AL., supra note 24, at 33–35.
29. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 181; see also Mario F. Bognanno et al., The
Conventional Wisdom of Discharge Arbitration Outcomes and Remedies: Fact or Fiction, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 153, 154 (2014).
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disputes efficiently with less formality than litigation.30 Many involve a
stepped procedure.31 An example of a hypothetical but representative
process follows: at the first step of the process the aggrieved employee,
the grievant, meets with an immediate supervisor to try to resolve the
issue.32 If the issue is not thereby resolved, a shop steward—an
employee who volunteers to represent the union, disseminate union
communications, foster solidarity, and resolve grievances—files a
formal written grievance on behalf of the grievant and discusses the
issue with a higher-level supervisor.33 If that meeting does not resolve
the dispute, then the union business representative and a manager
meet.34 A business representative is employed by the union to
represent the employees in contract negotiations and the grievance
arbitration system.35 Finally, the company president and union
president meet.36 If the dispute is not resolved through these internal
steps, which often occur on a tight time frame, then the union can
advance the dispute to arbitration.37
Different CBAs provide for different methods of selecting an
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. Some CBAs provide for use of a
service provider, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), to select
an arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators.38 The service provider
gives the parties a list of names,39 and the parties indicate their
preferences, which the service accounts for in assigning an arbitrator.40
Some CBAs may provide that the parties obtain a list from a service
provider, but then take turns striking arbitrators from the list until one
arbitrator remains.41 CBAs can specify the names of several arbitrators
and the parties may rotate through them or pick by striking arbitrator

30. RAY, ET AL., supra note 24, at 290 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974)).
31. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 206.
32. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 206.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Douglas E. Ray, Protecting the Parties’ Bargain After Misco: Court Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988).
38. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 207–08.
39. Id. at 207.
40. Id. at 208.
41. Id.
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names for each dispute.42 CBAs might also specify one particular
arbitrator for all disputes, and some may simply provide for the parties
to pick an arbitrator on a case by case basis.43
CBAs may contain an additional step before arbitration, which is the
joint arbitration board.44 This board is usually composed of an equal
number of employer or industry representatives and union representatives.45
They are normally not attorneys.46 If the dispute is resolved by the joint
arbitration board, the decision is binding as an arbitration award.47 In
some CBAs the joint arbitration board constitutes the final step of
arbitration.48
Even those arbitrators who are selected using a service provider or
are included as a named arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in a CBA
may not have JDs.49 Some have PhDs in labor relations or related fields,
while some have accrued expertise working in a particular unionized
industry.50
C. Labor Awards and the Perceived Fairness of Labor Arbitration
Just as the level of formality of judicial opinions varies from court to
court and judge to judge, the level of formality of labor awards varies

42. Id. at 207–08.
43. See id. at 208 (stating that because arbitration is contractual, CBAs can specify
a variety of processes for selecting an arbitrator).
44. See, e.g., Cemetery Stone Handlers, Local No. 106, 1954 Lab. Arb. LEXIS 55, at
*3 (1954).
45. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers v. Xtreme Drywall & Acoustics, No. 16-CV-5172, 2017
WL 3088912, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017); Cemetery Stone Handlers, 1954 Lab. Arb.
LEXIS 55, at *3.
46. See generally Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation:
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 235, 255 n.83 (2002) (“Non-lawyers have a long history of serving as arbitrators in
this country.”).
47. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers, 2017 WL 3088912, at *2. But see Cemetery Stone
Handlers, 1954 Lab. Arb. LEXIS 55, at *3–4 (finding a joint board decision
unenforceable where a party had right to invoke arbitration thereafter).
48. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers, 2017 WL 3088912, at *2 (noting that the CBA at issue
contained no right to appeal).
49. Michel Picher, Ronald L. Seeber & David B. Lipsky, The Arbitration Profession in
Transition: A Survey of the National Academy of Arbitrators, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS,
ARBITRATION 2000: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 12 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig
eds., 2001) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2000] (stating that
61.4% of NAA arbitrators in 1999 had a law or JD degree).
50. See id.
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across arbitrators. Many arbitrators who are members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) or who appear on the rosters of service
providers author written opinions supporting their award in each
case.51 They often follow a traditional format where they begin by
stating the issue, describe each party’s position and arguments on the
issue, discuss the reasons supporting their resolution, and conclude
with the award, which specifies who prevails and what remedy, if any,
is awarded.52 Some arbitrators, however, will write shorter opinions and
awards.53 Joint arbitration boards may announce awards orally and
memorialize them in a short document or letter.54
Whatever the process, it is worth noting that recent calls to prohibit
adhesive arbitration have generally excluded labor arbitration, which
is often perceived to be fairer than employment arbitration. For
example, both the Arbitration Fairness Act55 and the more recent Restoring
Justice for Workers Act56 proposed a prohibition on enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements in the employment and consumer
settings.57 Despite the concern that arbitration fails to provide adequate
51. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, LABOR ARBITRATION RULES 17 (2013),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Labor%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FWT-MCY2] (“The parties shall advise the AAA whenever they do
not require the arbitrator to accompany the award with an opinion.”); Weidemaier,
supra note 10, at 1102.
52. See JAY E. GRENIG & ROCCO M. SCANZA, FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR ARBITRATION
75 (2011); see, e.g., Pub. Sch. Emps. of Wash. v. W. Wash. Univ. (2007) (Duffy, Arb.),
http://www.duffyadr.com/pdf/decision1a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WRN-N7XP];
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 305 v. Unified W. Grocers, Inc. (2007) (Duffy, Arb.),
http://www.duffyadr.com/pdf/decision2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U45Q-FQHG];
Attachment to Complaint, Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., No.
05- 1430, 2006 WL 2787836 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2006), https://www.bloomberg
law.com/product/blaw/document/XH92302TG091V8JO6VOUDFURO8?document
Name=1.pdf&fmt=pdf.
53. In our data set, 26% of awards decided by a single neutral arbitrator selected
without assistance of a service provider included some explanation of their thinking
but did not include a full opinion. Of the awards decided without assistance of a service
provider (which includes joint boards and panels of neutral arbitrators), 31% included
some explanation of their thinking but did not include a full opinion.
54. See, e.g., Attachment to Counterclaim at 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52,
Merryman Excavation, Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, No. 06-C5160, 2010 WL 187241 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
product/blaw/document/X3JRS7P5O5193E8HMP4OMG18D21?documentName=8
8.xml.
55. S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018).
56. H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. (2018).
57. S. 2591 § 402(a); H.R. 7109 § 402(a)(1)–(2).
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protection for workers, both of these proposed federal laws exclude
labor arbitration from their scope. This exclusion is no mere oversight;
both explicitly permit arbitration provisions in CBAs between unions
and employers with the caveat that “no such arbitration provision shall
have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial
enforcement” of a constitutional or statutory right.58 The exclusion of
labor arbitration from the prohibition indicates general satisfaction
with the use of labor arbitration to resolve some workplace disputes,
yet it also reflects concern or dissatisfaction with the use of labor
arbitration to enforce discrimination and other constitutional and
statutory claims.
II. THE EXTERNAL AUTHORITY DILEMMA
Labor arbitrators are faced with a basic choice between restricting
their analysis to interpreting the CBA on its own terms59 or considering
additional authority.60 For example, given that many employment law
claims involve statutes, arbitrators might wish to consult and cite to
them. Common examples of applicable federal employment law
statutes include the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.61 In fact, a debate among labor
arbitrators has long raged over whether they should consider statutes,
particularly to ensure that their decisions comply with governing law.62
Generally, if a CBA contains an anti-discrimination clause, a worker can
both grieve a discriminatory discharge as a contract violation and bring
an employment discrimination suit based on a statutory violation.63
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett64 in 2009,

58. S. 2591 § 402(b)(2); H.R. 7109 § 402(d)(2). By inclusion of this provision, the
legislation would overturn 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009).
59. See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557.
60. See Howlett, supra note 14, at 78–79.
61. See Malin, supra note 16, at 4–7, 15.
62. Id. at 5–6.
63. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1974) (stating that
both courses of action “have legally independent origins and are equally available to
the aggrieved employee”).
64. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
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CBAs can clearly and unmistakably waive the right to go to court and
require the statutory claim be brought in arbitration.65
A labor arbitrator might consider other sources of law, such as
administrative regulations, or court decisions interpreting a statute or
common law.66 These sources can assist the arbitrator with both
statutory and non-statutory claims. Furthermore, the arbitrator might
consult or cite one or more secondary sources to edify her understanding
of governing legal principles.
External authority can be useful outside the context of statutory
claims. For example, labor arbitrators might look at external authority
for guidance on how to interpret or otherwise give meaning to a
certain CBA provision, such as a good faith or just-cause requirement.67
Or labor arbitrators might look at external authority because the CBA
specifically incorporates external law or a choice-of-law provision.68
A. The Debate over the Binary Choice
Labor arbitrators have long debated the relevance of external law to
their decisions. The disagreement crystalized in a debate between
Bernard Meltzer and Robert Howlett at the NAA annual meeting in
1967.69 Meltzer called for arbitrators to interpret the contract, without
regard to external law, in cases where there is “an irrepressible conflict”
between the CBA’s requirements and those of external law.70 In other
65. Id. at 251 (2009). An area ripe for further research would be to update the
findings of this Article with more recent awards to determine if Pyett had any significant
impact on the citation of external authority by labor arbitrators.
66. See Margaret Oppenheimer & Helen LaVan, Arbitration Awards in Discrimination
Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 34 ARB. J. 12, 13 (1979); see also Benjamin W. Wolkinson
& Dennis H. Liberson, The Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Grievances, 37 ARB. J. 35, 43–
44 (1982) (analyzing the congruency between decisions of arbitrators, the courts, and
the EEOC in sex discrimination cases).
67. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557 (noting arbitrators should consider
regulation as one factor when interpreting a loosely formulated standard like “just
cause” or adopt a contractual interpretation consistent with the law when a provision
is “susceptible to two interpretations”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, External Law in
Arbitration: Hard-Boiled, Soft-Boiled, and Sunny-Side up, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS,
ARBITRATION 2004: NEW ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 185, 188 (Charles J. Coleman ed.,
2005) (footnote omitted) (“Everyone seems to agree, including the Supreme Court,
that an arbitrator may look to the law for guidance in interpreting a contractual
provision.”).
68. See Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 66, at 44.
69. See Baldwin, supra note 16, at 31.
70. Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557.
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words, “respect the agreement and ignore the law.”71 For an arbitrator
to do otherwise would require exceeding the granted contractual
authority to interpret the contract,72 and it would potentially require
nonlawyers to interpret the law.73 Finally, Meltzer reasoned that if
arbitrators considered the law in cases where the law appeared to
conflict with the requirements of the contract, “they would be
impinging on an area in which courts or other official tribunals are
granted plenary authority,” rendering “limited judicial review” wholly
inappropriate.74
Howlett argued, in contrast, that arbitrators should consider
external law in addition to the contract language in order to avoid
issuing awards that require unlawful action.75 Some background about
the National Labor Relations Act76 (NLRA) and the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) is necessary to fully appreciate Howlett’s
argument. The NLRA prohibits employers and unions from
committing unfair labor practices.77 For instance, an employer cannot
discriminate against an employee for engaging in union activity or
collective action to improve working conditions,78 and employers must
bargain in good faith with the union before making changes to
working conditions.79 A CBA may, and often does, contain parallel
protections, such as a clause prohibiting anti-union discrimination.80
Alternatively, sometimes the CBA limits legal protections, such as by
permitting an employer to change certain working conditions without
bargaining with the union.81 In these circumstances, a single factual
dispute can give rise to both a grievance under the CBA and an unfair
labor practice charge filed with the NLRB.82
Howlett’s article presented at the twentieth annual NAA meeting
suggested that arbitrators should probe for statutory NLRA issues that
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 558.
74. Id. at 558–59.
75. Howlett, supra note 14, at 78–79; see also Howlett, supra note 23, at 69 (“As a
substitute for the courts, [arbitrators] apply the law as well as the language of a
document being construed or interpreted.”).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2018).
77. See § 158.
78. § 158(a)(1), (3).
79. § 158(a)(5).
80. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 182.
81. See RAY, supra note 24, at 305–06 (4th ed. 2014).
82. Id.
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need resolution.83 Howlett reasoned that while “in theory” the roles of
the arbitrator and the NLRB are “mutually exclusive,” in reality
“‘disputes are often difficult to classify’ and in some controversies a
‘blurred line . . . often exists.’”84 He argued that arbitrators are bound
by the law, and that all contracts include “all applicable law.”85 If an
award fails to consider the external law that circumscribes CBA’s, it
risks resulting in an error.86 Howlett was unconcerned with the
prospect of nonlawyers addressing legal issues; after all, many NLRB
agents who must interpret and apply the law are not attorneys.87
In a follow-up paper, Howlett argued that, as to non-NLRA legal
issues, arbitrators have the time and energy to research the law and
their expertise in labor disputes makes them more knowledgeable than
judges.88 Moreover, while labor arbitration is viewed as a substitute for a
strike, it is also a “substitute for the courts.”89 If involving arbitrators in
legal decisions results in more extensive judicial review of arbitral
decisions (traditionally limited to lack of jurisdiction, fraud, or
corruption), Howlett embraced the change to prevent mistakes.90
B. The Proposed Middle Ground
Soon after this debate took shape, Richard Mittenthal proposed a
“middle ground” position91—that an award may “permit conduct
forbidden by law but . . . not require conduct forbidden by law.”92 He
began by explaining that where the parties have incorporated statutory
provisions into their contract, an arbitrator’s proper response is to
refer to the relevant legislation.93 In addition, when a CBA uses general
language, an arbitrator should consider relevant materials such as a

83. Howlett, supra note 14, at 92.
84. Id. at 70 (quoting Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268–69
(1964)).
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 105.
88. Howlett, supra note 23, at 68.
89. Id. at 68–69 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with
a Public Function, 34 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 477, 494 (1965)).
90. Id. at 73.
91. Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in NAT’L ACAD. OF
ARBITRATORS, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, 42, 42.
92. Id. at 50.
93. Id. at 42–43.

2020]

ARBITRATORS’ RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY

1841

statute.94 If terms of the CBA are vague, the arbitrator should interpret
them in a way that harmonizes the contract with the law.95
However, Mittenthal refuted Howlett’s claim that the law is implied
in every CBA. First, he asserted that that premise rests on a fiction,
because judges first determine the meaning of a contract and only then
fashion the remedy to comply with law.96 Second, arbitrators derive
their authority from the parties’ contract and not from public law, as
judges do, and so should follow the intent of the parties over the
requirements of the law.97 Reference to governing law could prove
particularly problematic where the CBA makes no mention of potentially
conflicting law.98 Mittenthal argued that in these cases the arbitrator
should be able to resolve the contractual issue without consideration of
the law.99
Consider, for example, a dispute where the CBA requires seniority
in a layoff based on actual time worked but governing law requires
seniority for veterans during a layoff. Under Mittenthal’s approach, the
arbitrator would deny the veteran’s grievance because the employer
had followed the CBA, and the veteran could pursue his statutory
remedy separately in federal court.100
Despite this conclusion, Mittenthal stopped short of agreeing with
Meltzer that an arbitrator should follow only the contract and ignore
the law.101 Pragmatically, parties can pick arbitrators with legal expertise
when law is an issue, quashing Meltzer’s concern that arbitrators lack
legal expertise.102 Moreover, Mittenthal asserted that ignoring the law
undermines the contract because contracts routinely are formed with
reference to external law.103 Parties generally “do not wish to be bound
by an invalid provision” and often include a separability or saving
clause in their CBA.104 Furthermore, wholly ignoring legal mandates
potentially invites noncompliance with the award (on the part of an

94. Id. at 43.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 43–44.
97. Id. at 46.
98. Id. at 50.
99. Id. at 54.
100. Id. at 54–55.
101. Id. at 48–49.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id. at 49.
104. Id. at 49. These clauses direct the separation of any unlawful provision from
the agreement and the enforcement of the remaining lawful portions. Id.
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employer who is reluctant to violate the law),105 and such noncompliance
interferes with parties’ desire that arbitration awards be final and
binding.106 For example, in the scenario described above, if the
company had retained the veteran, and the non-veteran with more
seniority had grieved, it would be problematic for the arbitrator to
strictly follow the CBA thereby requiring the employer to violate the
veteran-preference law.
C. Others Weigh In
This debate has continued to the present. David Feller supports
Meltzer’s view, arguing that “[e]xternal law is irrelevant even where the
collective bargaining agreement has terms that look very much like a
statute.”107 Ted St. Antoine also sides with Meltzer,108 but he
acknowledges that “[c]ases of a truly irreconcilable conflict between
contract and law are probably quite rare.”109 He reasons that court
decisions do not “prohibit arbitrators from looking at external law in
their decisions” but rather prohibit “relying solely on external law
instead of the contract.”110 Indeed, one of the few grounds upon which
a court can reverse a labor arbitration award is where the award is not
grounded in the language of the CBA.111
In contrast, Marty Malin has sided with Howlett.112 He argues that
because of developments since the 1967 debate, arbitrators must be
able to, and should, rely on external public law.113 Malin discusses three
relevant developments, the first being that “a significant minority” of
courts now require employees to rely on their CBA’s grievance and

105. Id. at 50.
106. Id.
107. David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
973, 975 (1993).
108. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Use and Abuse of Precedent in Labor and Employment
Arbitration, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 431, 438 (2014) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Use and
Abuse of Precedent]; see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Presidential Address: Contract Reading
Revisited, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2000, supra note 49, at 1, 15–16
(asserting that an arbitrator should follow the contract rather than external law where
a conflict between the two arises).
109. St. Antoine, Use and Abuse of Precedent, supra note 108, at 439.
110. Id. at 440.
111. Id. at 439–40.
112. See generally Malin, supra note 16, at 3 (urging courts to endorse Howlett’s
position on enforcing arbitration awards that rely on external law).
113. Id. at 14 (emphasizing how changes in employment law and labor arbitration
have spurred the need to rely on external law).
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arbitration procedure to bring public law claims.114 Second, even more
courts are relying on an arbitration award “unfavorable to the employee
as a basis for granting summary judgment against the employee in
subsequent public law claims litigation.”115 Finally, following its enactment
in 1993, labor arbitrators must now consider the FMLA.116 The FMLA
grants a right to leave for a serious health condition and prohibits
employers from using the leave adversely in employment actions.
Accordingly, arbitrators frequently resolve disputes over discipline or
discharge resulting from attendance infractions and must consider plans
that are required to comply with the FMLA.117
Dennis Nolan agrees with Malin that today arbitrators simply cannot
ignore the law.118 Parties “incorporated statutory law into their
agreements either expressly or impliedly.”119 In more instances, both
parties, rather than just one, “began to argue legal questions,” making
it much more difficult for an arbitrator to refuse to consider external
law.120
D. The Most Recent Proposal
Most recently, Philip Baldwin argued that Meltzer’s position has
become indefensible in light of new developments in labor and
employment law.121 Baldwin points to a “proliferation of employment
law statutes,”122 a shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence toward strongly
deferring to arbitrators’ statutory interpretations,123 and an increase in
the proportion of arbitrators who are educated in law.124 Baldwin aims
to help labor arbitrators by “articulating an approach that allows for
measured consideration of external law to an extent that was wholly
114. Id.
115. Id. at 14–15.
116. Id. at 15.
117. Id. at 25–26.
118. Nolan, supra note 17, at 11 (“[T]he enormous outpouring of laws regulating
employment . . . made it almost impossible to avoid potential conflicts between contracts
and external law.”).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 11–12.
121. Baldwin, supra note 16 at 31.
122. Id. at 31, 39 (stating many employment statutes had either just been
promulgated, or had yet to be promulgated, at the time of the 1967 debate).
123. See id. at 40 (noting that the perception of arbitral incompetency that
supported the “‘traditional’ approach” is no longer endorsed by the Court).
124. See id. at 46 (highlighting that studies have found that labor arbitrators are as
competent as judges to handle legal questions).
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unorthodox” at the time of the Meltzer-Howlett debate.125 Baldwin
proposes four guidelines for labor arbitrators to use to “reconcile the
collective bargaining agreement with external law”:126
1. Labor arbitrators should consider external law rather than
interpreting the CBA in isolation.127
2. Labor arbitrators should interpret the CBA using an extremely
strong “presumption of legality.”128
3. Labor arbitrators should not consider external law sua sponte,
instead addressing external law only when raised by a party.129
4. Labor arbitrators should not assume every requirement of an
external law is incorporated in the CBA.130
Baldwin’s article explains that even when a CBA “expressly incorporate[s]
a statute,” arbitrators should assume only the broad goals of the statute, and
not every detail of the statute, have been incorporated.131 Arbitrators should
not require illegal conduct, but should rely on the CBA over external law
if the CBA permits, rather than requires, illegal conduct.132
E. The Inquiry into What Labor Arbitrators Actually Consider
While labor law scholars and labor arbitrators have extensively
debated whether arbitrators should consider external authority, much
less has been written about whether labor arbitrators do actually
consider external authority. And much of what has been written on the
latter inquiry is not recent.
In a 1975 study, Harry T. Edwards sent a questionnaire to the
members of the NAA, and 200 of the 409 recipients responded.133 The

125. Id. at 31.
126. Id. at 50.
127. See id. at 51–52 (noting that arbitrators must supplement the contract with
external law to carry out the parties’ true intentions).
128. See id. at 52 (asserting that arbitrators should take extra care to issue an award
that complies with the law).
129. Id. at 54 (noting that the arbitrator as a neutral adjudicator should wait for a
party to raise the issue, even if he or she notices a potential conflict).
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id. (quoting Richard I. Bloch, The Changing Face of Just Cause: One Standard or
Many?, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2000, supra note 49, at 37).
132. Id. at 57 (noting that if illegal conduct is simply permitted rather than
required, the arbitrator “is not forcing anyone to be a two-time loser or law breaker”).
133. Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical
Study, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION—1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 59, 70 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds.,
1976).
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study “attempted to determine . . . the extent to which arbitrators are
competent to handle ‘legal’ issues in employment discrimination
cases.”134 The survey found that 77% of the respondents had read judicial
opinions involving Title VII discrimination claims, 16% had never read
judicial opinions involving discrimination claims, and 7% declined to
answer.135 Additionally, 52% indicated that they read “labor advance
sheets, a type of secondary source,136 to keep abreast of current
developments under Title VII,” while 40% indicated they did not, and
8% declined to answer.137
Overall, the survey found that close to two thirds of arbitrators who
responded believe that an arbitrator’s role in a contractual grievance
dispute does not include applying or interpreting statutes.138 Nearly all
of the subset of respondents “conceded that there were certain
exceptions to this rule.” Of the subset, 85% agreed that an arbitrator
may consider public law “to avoid compelling” a party “to do
something that is clearly unlawful.”139 Ninety-five percent “agreed that
an arbitrator” may refer to governing law if “the parties have intentionally
adopted a contract clause . . . with the object of incorporating the body
of public law into the contract.”140 Additionally, 97% agreed that an
arbitrator should “should consider public law when the parties have,
by submission, conferred jurisdiction” upon the arbitrator “to decide
the contract issue in light of the applicable federal or state law.”141 Onethird of the overall respondents believed that “a collective bargaining
agreement must be read to include by reference all public law applicable
thereto.”142
In 1979, Margaret Oppenheimer and Helen LaVan examined labor
arbitration awards in disputes involving employment discrimination.143
The data set consisted of all employment “discrimination cases from
134. Id. at 71.
135. Id.
136. Advance sheets would summarize recent court and administrative decisions.
See UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW, Employment & Labor Law, https://www.uidaho.edu//media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/library/legal-research/guides/employmentlabor-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/6URW-XKD2] (describing advance sheets as a
common feature of employment and labor law reporters).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 79.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 12.
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March 1973 through November 1975” published in the Bureau of
National Affairs (BNA) Labor Arbitration Reports, a total of 86 cases.144
Arbitrators cited “federal or state law or EEOC guidelines” 60% of the
time, judicial decisions 40% of the time, and other arbitration awards
35% of the time.145 Of these three categories of citation to external
authority, 17% of the arbitrators cited all three in their awards, while
an additional 28% cited two of the three.146 The analysis found that
citation to federal or state law or EEOC guidelines was higher in cases
where the grievant prevailed, discrimination was found, or back pay
was awarded.147 There was no significant relationship between these
types of cases and citation to judicial decisions and other arbitration
awards, except for a low correlation to an award of back pay.148
Although roughly two-thirds of the arbitrators were lawyers, it had no
effect on the variables used to reach a decision and was not related to
the means by which arbitrators justified their decisions.149 The article
concludes that arbitrators who are attorneys may not be more qualified
to hear discrimination cases based on a legal background alone, and
that other qualifications such as “familiarity with the industry and
discrimination law . . . may be more relevant.”150
Benjamin Wolkinson and Dennis Liberson reviewed labor arbitration
cases involving certain types of sex discrimination cases from the BNA
Labor Arbitration Reports from 1975 to 1980.151 They concluded that
many arbitrators adopted Howlett’s position “that every agreement
implicitly incorporated all applicable law”152 and cited to judicial
decisions and EEOC guidance.153 The article concluded that “some
arbitrators still adhere to the position advocated by . . . Meltzer that
arbitrators . . . should . . . respect the agreement and ignore the law,”
while others “apply the law if there exists a definitive judicial decision
bearing on the issue.”154

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 66, at 36.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
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Perry A. Zirkel examined “a random sample of 100 arbitration
awards” from the BNA Labor Arbitration Reports from 1972 to 1982.155
He found that only 5% of awards involved “interpretation of legal and
other precedent.”156 These five awards did not correlate with
arbitrators being attorneys or representatives being attorneys.157 He
determined that, in addition to these five cases, in seven other cases,
court decisions and other authority played a secondary role, and he
determined that court decisions or a statute played a secondary role in
two additional cases.158 He concluded that “external law and arbitral
authority played at least a secondary role in almost half . . . of the
cases.”159 He also concluded that “a solid third of the cases do not involve
any trace of the law, even merely in terminology or technique.”160
Patricia Greenfield examined arbitrators’ treatment of external law
in 106 arbitration awards decided between 1980 and 1985.161 The cases
were selected because at least one of the parties had filed an unfair
labor practice charge, meaning the statute at issue was the NLRA.162
Her study found that fifty-five of the 106 cases “cite statutory issues” in
the discussion section of the opinion, rather than only in the section
reciting the parties’ positions.163 Arbitrators were more likely to cite
statutory issues when the arbitrator was aware of a related unfair labor
practice charge and/or when at least one of the parties argued a
statutory issue.164 In addition, the type of case significantly impacted
the likelihood of the arbitrator addressing a statutory issue.165 In cases
alleging discrimination against an employee because of union activity,
termed “Section 8(a)(3) cases” because of the applicable section of the
NLRA, arbitrators were more likely to address statutory issues.166 They

155. Perry A. Zirkel, The Use of External Law in Labor Arbitration: An Analysis of Arbitral
Awards, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 31, 38.
156. Id. at 41.
157. Id. at 42.
158. Id. at 43.
159. Id. The sample size was 44.
160. Id. at 45.
161. Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 683, 687 (1992).
162. Id. at 684.
163. Id. at 688–89.
164. Id. at 690.
165. Id. at 691 (differentiating between 8(a)(3) charges of discrimination on the
basis of union activity and 8(a)(5) charges of failure to bargain).
166. Id.
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did so in thirty-five of forty-nine, or 71.4%, of the Section 8(a)(3)
cases.167
Arbitrators were significantly less likely to cite statutory issues in cases
alleging a refusal by an employer to bargain with the union, termed
“Section 8(a)(5) cases.”168 Arbitrators addressed the statutory issue in
only twelve of the thirty-one, or 38.7%, of the Section 8(a)(5) cases.169
Of the fifty-five cases raising statutory issues, fourteen cited NLRB
decisions,170 which would be approximately 25% of the cases raising
statutory issues and approximately 13% of the total 106 awards studied.
One of the primary conclusions of the article is that the majority of the
awards studied did not “create a record adequate for review” by the
NLRB, which had deferred its decision to the arbitrator.171 Despite
some exceptions, many arbitrators and NLRB Administrative Law
Judges dispose of cases after failing to address statutory issues sufficiently,
if at all.172
Dale Allen and Daniel Jennings surveyed the 641 members of the
NAA in 1987 and received 296 usable questionnaires.173 The
questionnaire asked the arbitrators to rank the importance of different
decision-making criteria.174 Of the seven factors, arbitrators ranked
state and federal law lowest.175 Allen and Jennings noted that “[i]n the
majority of arbitration cases,” the law has no bearing on the issue and
many arbitrators believe that they should “restrict themselves merely
to examination of the labor agreement.”176 Further, 88% of the
arbitrators do not consult published labor awards “in the majority of
decisions,” and 64% “state that the use of precedent is not significant
except for about one-third of the cases.”177
Ted St. Antoine reported the results of a survey of NAA arbitrators
about their use of external authority in a 2004 article.178 He opened
the article with the still valid observation that, “Meltzer and . . . Howlett
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 692.
171. Id. at 693.
172. Id.
173. A. Dale Allen, Jr. & Daniel F. Jennings, Sounding out the Nation’s Arbitrators: An
NAA Survey, 39 LAB. L.J. 423, 423 (1988).
174. Id. at 428.
175. Id. (noting that many respondents had difficulty ranking this factor).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189.
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squared off at our annual meeting in a classic confrontation on an issue
that refuses to die. What should an arbitrator do when there is a
seemingly irreconcilable conflict between a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement and the dictates of external law?”179 He concluded
that a cross-section of NAA members accept Meltzer’s position, “but
when the going gets tough, most of them move over into” Mittenthal’s
middle-ground approach.180 St. Antoine requested via the NAA’s
unofficial email list that the approximately 240 members complete a
questionnaire, and fifty-two members responded.181 The results indicated
that:
• About half of the arbitrators will cite external law only if the
parties have cited legal authorities.182
• About 30% of the arbitrators will cite external law, even if the
parties have not, “when it seems especially pertinent.”183
• Around 60% of respondents noted they “seldom feel required
to deal with the issue of contract versus law” because the “vast
majority of contracts should and can be interpreted as
consistent with the law.”184
• When the contract and external law irreconcilably conflict,
“almost twice as many arbitrators said they would follow the
contract, unless the parties instructed them otherwise, as said
they would follow the law.”185
• Almost 60% “would not order a party to violate external law as
part of their award.”186
These responses indicate labor arbitrators’ varied approaches to
resolving disputes with external law.
A 2005 article by Malin and Jeanne Vonhof addresses how arbitrators
should deal with parties’ expectations that prior FMLA-protected leave
should not be subject to attack in an arbitration regarding a later
attendance violation.187 While Malin and Vonhof do not specifically
address how often arbitrators cite external authority, such as the

179. Id. at 185.
180. Id. at 186.
181. Id. at 189.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 190.
186. Id. at 189–90.
187. See Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor Arbitrator,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 199, 199–200 (2005).
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FMLA, they note that “parties’ expectations are evolving” because of
the “pervasive influence of the FMLA.”188 Further, they noted that to
the extent parties expect FMLA issues to be addressed by arbitrators,
there is no longer a conflict between traditional expectations that
arbitrators will interpret the contract as written and what the law
requires.189 Malin also noted that arbitrators decide cases involving the
FMLA by relying on its provisions and the Department of Labor
regulations “without regard to whether the collective bargaining
agreement says anything about the FMLA.”190
In a 2012 article, Mark Weidemaier explored how often labor awards
published by BNA cited external authority.191 He examined 208
randomly selected awards192 and found that approximately 48.6% of
the awards cited to either a judicial opinion or another arbitration
award.193 Of those arbitrators, 76.2% cited “at least one arbitration
award,” 35.6% cited arbitration awards but not judicial opinions, and
14.9% cited only judicial opinions.194 Looking more closely at a subset
of twenty-five awards, the study indicates that the average number of
citations to judicial opinions or labor awards was 8.7 unique citations,
with an average of 3.9 being to judicial opinions and 4.5 to arbitration
awards.195 The awards cited an average of “two or more unique
precedents per page of legal analysis.”196 Of these citations, an average
of 2.3 “discussed the cited source in some detail or explicitly indicated
reliance on the source.”197 In other words, the arbitrators “did more
than pepper their awards with string citations.”198
In a 2013 article, Levinson explored how often labor arbitration
awards in discrimination cases published by BNA Labor Arbitration
Reports relied on different forms of external authority.199 From a total
of 111 awards involving statutory claims, forty “cited only the relevant
188. Id. at 200.
189. Id.
190. Malin, supra note 16, at 26 (quoting FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI,
HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 520 (Alan Myles Rubin ed., 6th ed. 2003)).
191. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1101.
192. Id. at 1104–05.
193. Id. at 1111.
194. Id. at 1126.
195. Id. at 1120–21.
196. Id. at 1121.
197. Id. at 1121–22.
198. Id. at 1121.
199. See Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 830 (2013).
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statute or no legal authority.”200 Seventy-one cited to external authority
other than the statute involved.201 Fifty-two cited judicial opinions,
thirteen cited EEOC guidelines or regulations, and twenty-six cited other
arbitral awards.202 Seventeen awards cited a treatise or other secondary
source.203 Thus, approximately 64% of the awards cited to external
legal authority of some kind, and 47% to judicial opinions.
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
In this article, we investigate whether labor arbitrators actually are
considering statutes and other external authority, and to what extent.
Then, to the extent possible, we explore whether they did so in certain
types of cases. For instance, are arbitrators more likely to consider
external authority in cases involving statutory claims than those for
breach of the CBA? Are they more likely to consider external authority
in cases involving breach of just-cause provisions than in other breach
of CBA claims?
Perhaps attributes of the particular arbitrator affect whether or not
they consider external authority. Some labor arbitrators do not have a
JD, so might not consult external law because they do not have formal
legal training. While data on the topic is sparse, as of 2000, 61.4% of
NAA arbitrators had JDs,204 and a study of eighty-one labor arbitrators’
awards issued between 1982 and 2005 found approximately 64.2% had
JDs.205 Our data set includes decisions made by joint arbitration boards,
which are groups of union and employer representatives, who are
unlikely to have JDs.206 While we cannot ascertain precisely from the
awards whether a particular arbitrator does or does not have a JD, we

200. Id. at 831.
201. Id. at 830.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Picher, Seeber & Lipsky, supra note 49, at 12; see also Allen & Jennings, supra
note 173, at 423 (reporting that a 1987 survey of 296 NAA members found that 51%
of respondents possessed a law school education); J. Timothy Sprehe & Jeffrey
Small, Members and Nonmembers of the National Academy of Arbitrators: Do They Differ?,
39 ARB. J. 25, 27–28 (1984) (reporting that a 1983 survey of NAA members and
nonmembers found that 54.3% of 1,040 arbitrators on the national AAA list of labor
arbitrators held a law degree).
205. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., MORE THAN WE HAVE EVER KNOWN ABOUT DISCIPLINE
AND DISCHARGE IN LABOR ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 7, 22 (2015).
206. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 46, at 255 n.83.
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know the service provider, such as AAA or FMCS, and therefore
whether there is a higher likelihood a particular arbitrator has a JD.207
Relatedly, perhaps having attorney representation of the parties in
the arbitration increases the likelihood of the arbitrator citing external
authority. Attorneys may be more likely than other union or management
representatives to cite external authority to the arbitrator, and so the
arbitrators are more likely to cite it themselves.
To address these and other questions, we created a new database of
labor arbitration awards. This is our first article examining the awards
in the newly created database. Prior studies examining labor arbitration
awards and their use of external authority have primarily used awards
published in BNA Labor Arbitration Reports.208 Other studies have
surveyed members of the NAA.209 We intend to use the data from our
distinct set of awards to supplement the findings of others based on
different data sets. Our data set includes AAA awards, awards from
other services providers, and those from other selection processes.
While some of the cases may have been published by BNA, some most
likely were not.210
Our labor arbitration awards are drawn from the Public Access to
Court Electronic Records federal court electronic docket (PACER).
We searched on Bloomberg in the PACER database for “employ! and
(arbitral /2 award).” We included all federal district court cases from
2000 to 2011 where the nature of the suit was classified as any of the
following: Civil Rights - Disabilities - Employment [445]; Civil Rights Employment [442]; Labor - Fair Labor Standards Act [710]; Labor Family and Medical Leave Act [751]; Labor - Labor/Management
Relations [720]; Labor - Labor/Management Reporting & Disclosure
[730]; Labor - Other Litigation [790]; Other Statutes - Arbitration
[896]. We used the broad search term in order to find all cases involving
an arbitration award that dealt with employment or employers.
A research assistant examined each docket in all of the resulting
cases from the years 2000 to 2006 and the docket in each fourth case
in our results for the years 2007 to 2011 to ascertain whether the case
207. Because our data set contains the names of the arbitrators, a follow-up study
could research whether each arbitrator had a JD and compare the use of external law
specifically to educational background.
208. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 199, at 810; Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note
66, at 13.
209. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 133, at 70; Picher, Seeber & Lipsky, supra note 49.
210. BNA only publishes awards that arbitrators send them with the permission of
both parties. Levinson, supra note 199, at 811.
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involved an arbitration award and whether the arbitration award at
issue in the case was available.211 Due to limited time and resources, we
used sampling for results from 2007 to 2011 because there were over
200 cases in each of those years. A case was considered off point if it
involved arbitration but not an award, such as a case where arbitration
was compelled by the court’s decision, or a case that involved arbitration
of a non-employment-related issue. The research assistants coded each
available award in the on-point cases for different information,
including citation to external authority. For this article, we narrowed
the database to include only labor arbitration awards, excluding
employment arbitration awards, by including only those cases where
the party opposing the employer212 was a union or where the claim type
was a breach of a CBA. Our new database of labor arbitration awards
consists of 602 awards.
No dataset of awards is perfectly representative. Because arbitration
is a private process, obtaining all labor arbitration awards for a certain
period or obtaining a truly randomly-selected sample is not possible.
Instead, if we want to provide any empirical evidence about labor
arbitration, and arbitration more generally, we must use a nonrepresentative sample and acknowledge the limitations of the data set.
Because arbitration plays an increasingly important role in legal
dispute resolution, we believe having empirical data and acknowledging
its limitations is preferable to having no data at all, and that research
using such data can still yield valuable results.
Our new data set overcomes some of the acknowledged limitations
of the samples of arbitration awards used by previous authors, but has
limitations of its own. Data published by BNA Labor Arbitration Reports
has been a main source used in the study of labor arbitration.213 But
BNA only publishes awards when the arbitrator obtains the permission
of the parties and sends BNA the award.214 Some arbitrators elect not

211. Thirty research assistants examined the dockets over a five-year period.
Especially for cases in 2000 and 2001, the award is often not available in the electronic
database, and we did not have funding to obtain the actual court files with the paper
copies of the awards.
212. Per our coding, the union might also oppose a trust fund or other entity,
guaranteeing that we had all arbitration awards involving unions.
213. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 199, at 811 (using BNA reports for a study on
employment discrimination claims in labor arbitration); Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra
note 66, at 13 (using BNA reports for a study on discrimination disputes in labor
arbitration).
214. Levinson, supra note 199, at 811.
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to publish their awards or to publish only certain awards.215 Unlike
BNA, our database includes awards that the parties did not elect to
publish, including awards by joint arbitration boards. Our data come
from PACER, a system for all federal district court cases in the nation
that provides access to every document electronically filed in each
case.216 Our database does not include any awards that were not
involved in a court case, indicating that we do not have many of the
awards where both parties were satisfied and complied with the award.
We do, however, have a significant number of uncontested awards.
Some of our awards were confirmed without opposition so the parties
were satisfied. Other awards were used as support for an argument,
sometimes by other parties, and so likely were complied with by the
parties involved in the arbitration without litigation.
Many parties file a case in federal district court when they are
dissatisfied with an award in an effort to vacate it, although the
standard for vacating an arbitration award is a difficult one to satisfy.217
The narrow grounds upon which a labor award can be vacated are
when: (1) “the award results from procedural unfairness, such as fraud,
corruption, or bias,” (2) the arbitrator clearly exceeded the authority
to interpret the CBA by contravening a clear provision, or (3) the
award itself, not the CBA provision, “violates a fundamental and welldefined public policy.”218 Because our data set likely overrepresents
awards with which one party was dissatisfied, we might adjust our
expectations accordingly. For instance, perhaps awards that cite
external authority are less likely to be contested because the parties
perceive them as more authoritative—or perhaps they are more likely
to be contested because the parties believe external law should not
have been relied on.
Our data set includes a substantial number of awards that the parties
did not dispute. It contains 258 cases, approximately 42.86% of the
cases, where the award was not challenged.219 Sometimes unions make
a regular practice of confirming labor awards because they are not self215. Id.
216. PACER, https://www.pacer.gov [https://perma.cc/U2YG-QE4P].
217. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 190.
218. Id.
219. These cases were each coded as 0=no challenge indicated in response to the
query for CHALLENGE=Grounds for challenge to arbitrator’s award. The resolution
in these cases ranges from settlement to non-merits dismissal, confirmation of an
award by default judgment, or confirmation of an award through a mechanism other
than default judgment.
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enforcing.220 In these cases, the union files in federal district court to
confirm the award, and the employer either does not appear, so that a
default judgment issues, or the employer stipulates to the
confirmation.221 Our data set also includes cases where one of the
parties cites to an arbitration award as relevant authority. The prior
award could deal with the same fact pattern and parties involved in the
litigation. Or the award could simply be relevant to the court case but
be between completely different parties than those involved in the
court case, in the same way a decision from another district court, a
state court, or an administrative agency might be relevant to the case.
In the latter category of cases, arbitrators use the award in a manner
similar to other persuasive authority, and the parties to the arbitration
did not dispute the outcome of the award. In the former cases, the
parties did not directly dispute the award either, which we know
because no one is moving to vacate it; rather, they may disagree over
whether the court should rule similarly to how the arbitrator ruled in
the former dispute. These cases that use an award to support an
argument include cases brought for unlawful employment discrimination
under Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, wage and hour
cases, FMLA cases, and a broad range of other types of labor and
employment law disputes, such as those involving whistleblowers,
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, breach of duty of fair
representation, due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
More of the awards in our data set are drawn from later years than
from earlier years, given our reliance on an electronic database. So,
our data may demonstrate what was true of labor awards in the mid2000s more reliably than what was true in the early 2000s.
We plan to write additional articles further examining the use of
external law in the awards in the new dataset. One will examine the use
of prior labor awards, and another will explore the relationship
between the citation to external authority in the awards to the
outcomes in the court litigation. A third will address the general issue
of the lawlessness of arbitration.

220. See WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 136.
221. Id. at 125–26 n.169, 136, 153 n.79 (giving examples of various arbitration
outcomes).
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IV. THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
This Part first sets out our findings about how many awards cite to
external authority, specifically statutes, cases, administrative authority,
or secondary sources.222 It then looks at whether certain attributes of
the arbitration proceedings correlate with the citation to external
authority. Finally, it discusses whether certain types of labor arbitration
disputes are correlated more highly with citation to external authority.
A. Rates of Citation to External Authority
This section examines the number of awards that cite to external
authority.
1.

Citation to statutes
Of the 602 awards in the database, only seventeen cite to, or rely on,
a statute. This is approximately 2.82% of the cases. Eleven additional
awards mention a statute but do not address it in the analysis. Five
awards explicitly decline to address a statutory issue. Overall, 565
awards, approximately 93.85%, do not mention a statute at all. Figure
1 represents the percentage breakdowns between awards that mention,
cite to, or rely on a statute and those that do not.223

222. Some awards cite to other labor arbitration awards, and we will share these
findings in an article focused on the use of “precedent” in labor arbitration.
223. Four awards are not included in the count because we have only a part of the
award, and so cannot know whether statutes were cited in the portions of the awards
we do not have.
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Figure 1

Citation to Statutes (N=602)
2.82%

0.83%

0.66%

1.83%

No statute cited (N=565)
Cited but ignored (N=11)
Cited and followed (N=17)
Cited but not followed (N=5)
Unknown (N=4)
93.85%

These findings are consistent with the survey responses of arbitrators
indicating that in most cases they need not consider a statute, often because
only a contractual breach is at issue.224 Despite the acknowledgement by
labor arbitration authorities that reliance on statutes has increased over
the years,225 our data indicate that during the 2000s, in the vast majority
of cases, arbitrators did not cite to statutes. While other studies of
awards have found much higher percentages of awards relying on
statutes, those studies exclusively addressed situations of prohibited
discrimination, such as on the basis of race or sex,226 or cases known to
have raised an NLRA issue.227
224. See Allen & Jennings, supra note 173, at 428 (reporting responses to arbitrator
questionnaires); St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189–90 (examining arbitrators’
questionnaire responses on using external law in determinations).
225. See Malin & Vonhof, supra note 187, at 232 (discussing the impact of the FMLA
on labor arbitration); Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 66, at 44 (analyzing
arbitrators’ willingness to incorporate Title VII in award determinations).
226. See Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13 (finding 60% of 86 BNA labor
arbitration awards from 1970 to 1975 that dealt with discrimination cited a federal or
state statute or EEOC guidelines).
227. See Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689 (finding 51.9% of 106 labor arbitration
awards related to NLRB cases from 1981 to 1985 cited “relevant statutory provisions”
from the NLRA).
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Our data also indicate that in very few awards, just five in total,
arbitrators explicitly followed the Meltzer approach and declined to
address a statutory issue.228 In another handful of cases, eleven awards
mention a statute but do not apply it. One of the parties likely
mentioned a statute, but the arbitrator did not address it in the award’s
reasoning. One possible reason is that the arbitrator decided not to
apply external authority without explicitly so stating, but another is
that the arbitrator could decide the case without needing to reach the
statutory issue or that a party cited the statute as persuasive authority
on a non-statutory issue.229
2.

Citation to cases
As shown in Figure 2, seventy-eight, or approximately 12.96%, of the
awards cite or rely on at least one judicial opinion.230

228. See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557 (asserting that arbitrators should follow the
contract over external law).
229. An interesting follow-up would be to pull and read these eleven awards to
determine why the arbitrators did not explicitly address the statute.
230. The coding for cases indicated whenever a case was cited or relied on by an
arbitrator. For example, if an arbitrator used a well-known case name, such as
McDonnell Douglas, that would be included in the count. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The same is true for administrative sources and secondary
sources. We use the word “cite” as shorthand throughout the Article for the findings
reporting whether awards cited or relied on these sources. Three awards are not
included in the count because we have only a part of the award, and so cannot know
whether opinions were cited in the portions of the awards we do not have.
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Figure 2

Citation to Cases (N=602)
12.96%

0.50%

No cases cited (N=521)
Case cited or relied on (N=78)
Unknown (N=3)

86.54%

We were initially surprised by the relatively low number of awards
that cite to a court opinion because we had anticipated a percentage
closer to 25% based on Weidemaier’s study of 208 awards published in
BNA Labor Arbitration Reports.231 That study reported that 101 of the 208
cases (48.6%) cited to either an arbitration award or judicial
opinion.232 Of those 101, 55.4% cited a judicial opinion, leading us to
conclude that 56 of the 208, approximately 27% of the total, cited to a
judicial opinion.233 The difference may reflect that published awards
are more likely than unpublished awards to cite to judicial opinions or
may be caused by different types of cases in the two data sets. Weidemaier’s
data set included 137 discipline or discharge cases (approximately 65.87%)
and seventy-one other cases.234 Our data set includes 208 discipline or
discharge cases235 (approximately 34.55%) and 394 other cases, and,

231. See Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1112–14.
232. Id. at 1145 tbl.A-1.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1105 tbl.1.
235. Coded among cases where a collective bargaining agreement is allegedly
breached as involving a just-cause provision (states employees can be disciplined only
for good reason).
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surprisingly, we did find that cases asserting a breach of a just-cause
provision correlate with higher citation to external authority.236
The awards in our database that cite judicial opinions cite an average
of 3.68 opinions each, with a median citation of two cases. The average
is consistent with Weidemaier’s finding that twenty-five BNA labor award
cases citing external authority cited an average of 3.9 judicial opinions.237
Fifty of the seventy-seven,238 approximately 64.9%, cite more than
one judicial decision, while twenty-seven, 35%, cite only one judicial
opinion. The highest number of judicial opinions cited by an award in
our dataset is twenty. We believe these statistics are consistent with
Weidemaier’s conclusion, based on a close review of citation practices,
that citation to judicial opinions, while not widespread, “plays more
than a trivial role” in labor arbitration.239
3.

Citation to administrative authority
Figure 3 shows that of the 602 awards, twenty-three awards,
approximately 3.82%, cite to administrative authority, such as EEOC
regulations and NLRB decisions.240

236. See infra Table 9.
237. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1120, 1121 tbl.3.
238. The number of awards that cite a judicial opinion is seventy-seven, rather than
seventy-eight, because there is one partial award citing at least one judicial opinion
where the actual number of opinions cited in the full award is unknown. This award is
excluded from the count.
239. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1121.
240. Four awards are not included in the count because we have only a part of the
award, and so cannot know whether administrative sources were cited in the portions
of the awards we do not have.
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Figure 3

Citation to Adminstrative Sources (N=602)
3.82%

0.66%

No administrative sources cited
(N=575)
Administrative sources cited or
relied on (N=23)
Unknown (N=4)

95.51%

Scholars recognize that citation of administrative authority is an
important indicator, like citation of statutes and judicial opinions, of
whether arbitrators consider external authority.241 Administrative
authority relates to a wide variety of employment-related disputes in a
similar way to judicial opinions, and our study provides a new data
point as to how often labor awards cite to administrative authority.
Only two prior studies have looked specifically at the rate at which
labor arbitration awards cite to administrative authority. Greenfield’s
study found that fourteen of the 106 awards, approximately 13%, cited
to NLRB decisions,242 and Levinson’s study found that thirteen of 111
awards, approximately 11.71%, cited to EEOC guidelines.243 These
studies focused on cases alleging discrimination or a violation of the
NLRA, likely accounting for our finding that a lower percentage of
labor awards, drawn from all types of cases, cite to or rely on administrative
authority.244
241. See, e.g., Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13 (presenting findings that
60% of arbitration awards in their study cited statutes or EEOC guidelines); Wolkinson
& Liberson, supra note 66, at 44 (noting it is “not unusual” for arbitrators to adopt
decisions of the EEOC in sex discrimination arbitration).
242. Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689 tbl.1, 692.
243. Levinson, supra note 199, at 830.
244. See Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689 tbl.1, 692; Levinson, supra note 199, at 830.
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4.

Citation to secondary sources
As shown in Figure 4, of the 602 awards, seventy-nine awards,
approximately 13.12%, cite to a secondary source.245
Figure 4

Citation to Secondary Sources (N=602)
13.12%

0.66%

No secondary sources cited
(N=519)
Secondary sources cited or
relied on (N=79)
Unknown (N=4)

86.21%

Again, only two studies examine the use of secondary sources by
labor arbitrators. Edwards’ survey found that 52% of labor arbitrators
reviewed labor advance sheets.246 Levinson found that seventeen of 111
labor arbitration awards, approximately 15.32%, cited secondary sources.247
That study focused on discrimination cases, and so the finding that a
similar percentage of the current database of awards, of which many
are solely breach of contract cases unrelated to any statutory claims,

245. Four awards are not included in the count because we have only a part of the
award, and so cannot know whether secondary sources were cited in the portions of
the awards we do not have.
246. Edwards, supra note 133, at 71. Advance sheets would summarize recent court
and administrative decisions. See UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW, Employment & Labor
Law, https://www.uidaho.edu/-/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/library/legalresearch/guides/employment-labor-law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6URW-XKD2]
(describing advance sheets as a common feature of employment and labor law
reporters).
247. Levinson, supra note 199, at 830.
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has a similar percentage of awards with citations to secondary sources
is interesting.248
We included citation to secondary sources because some courts rely
on secondary sources for established principles of law, and arbitrators
likely do also. We hypothesize that arbitrators may rely on secondary
sources to a greater extent than some courts do for a variety of reasons,
such as not having as extensive access to judicial opinions, not being
attorneys and so relying on summaries provided by attorneys, or having
more limited time.
We note that for the focus of this article on whether arbitration
awards cite to authority external to the contract, as relevant to the
debate over whether arbitrators should follow the law and not just the
contract, we chose to focus on citation to statutes, judicial opinions,
and administrative authority, rather than to other labor arbitration
awards.249 The citation to secondary sources variable may be overinclusive
because it includes secondary sources that summarize labor arbitration
awards as well as those that summarize statutory law, including judicial
opinions and administrative authority.
5.

Overall citation to external authority
Of the 602 awards, ninety-nine awards, approximately 16.4%, cite to
at least one statute, judicial opinion, or administrative authority. 503
awards, more than 83%, cite no external authority, other than possibly
a secondary authority.
Our finding of 17% is substantially different from previous authors’
findings. In 1979, Oppenheimer and LaVan found that 60% of labor
arbitration awards in her sample cited a statute or regulation,250 and
Greenfield found that 51.9% of labor arbitration awards addressed
statutory issues.251 Even Zirkel’s study, which was not limited to awards
involving discrimination, concluded that a third of the cases did not
involve external authority,252 a much lower percentage than the more
than 83% we find cite no external authority. Again, because those
studies focused on discrimination and cases alleging an NLRA
violation,253 the lower number in our study may be due to the larger
number of cases in the data set that are purely contractual disputes
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Cf. Zirkel, supra note 155, at 31 nn.8–9.
Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13.
Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689.
Zirkel, supra note 155, at 45.
Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689; Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13.
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that do not relate to statutory law. The 17% appears to be in line with
the survey findings that most labor arbitrators do not find statutory law
relevant in most disputes,254 and that some do not apply statutory law
unless asked to do so by the parties.255 As reported, some likely do not
consider external authority even in situations where the CBA conflicts
with the law.256
Of the awards citing external authority—at least one statute, judicial
opinion, or administrative authority—the majority cite only judicial
opinions. Of the ninety-nine awards, sixty-seven awards, approximately
67.7%, cite only one or more judicial opinions, and no statute or
administrative authority. Thirteen of the ninety-nine awards, approximately
13%, cite more than one of the three types of external authority—statute,
judicial opinion, and administrative authority. Three of the awards cite a
statute and one or more judicial opinions, and one cites a statute and
one or more administrative documents. Only seven of the ninety-nine
awards cite only a statute.
Overall, the raw numbers point to Meltzer as the winner of the
debate, at least as a positive matter; most arbitrators do not cite to
external authority in the majority of the cases in our data set. Looking
at sheer numbers does not disclose the subset of the cases, if any, in
which the law would have required a different outcome than the
contract, and does not answer the overarching question of whether
arbitrators should consider external authority. There are only five
cases in our data set where we know that the arbitrator explicitly
declined to follow a statute mentioned in the award, and only another
254. Allen & Jennings, supra note 173, at 428 (stating that “[i]n the majority of
arbitration cases,” the law has no bearing on the dispute, and many neutrals believe
they should “restrict themselves merely to examination of the labor agreement”);
Edwards, supra note 133, at 79 (“Nearly two thirds of the responding arbitrators . . .
believed that an arbitrator has no business interpreting or applying a public statute in
a contractual grievance dispute.”); St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189 (explaining that
around 60% of respondents noted they “seldom feel required to deal with the issue of
contract versus law because . . . the vast majority of contracts should and can be
interpreted as consistent with the law”).
255. See Edwards, supra note 133, at 79 (“97[%] . . . agreed that an arbitrator should
consider public law when the parties have, by submission, conferred jurisdiction upon
[the arbitrator] to decide the contract issue in light of the applicable federal or state
law.”); St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189 (stating that roughly half of responding
arbitrators cite to external law only if the parties have cited legal authorities).
256. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 190 (stating that “almost twice as many arbitrators
said they would follow the contract [when law and contract irreconcilably conflict] . . .
as said they would follow the law,” unless otherwise instructed by the parties).
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eleven mention a statute that was not relied on. So, we cannot conclude
that arbitrators follow Meltzer “hands down.”
Indeed, awards are citing external authority in a significant minority
of cases. And further examination of the data may disclose that the
cases that do not cite external authority are the type that focus on
contractual claims that are unrelated to statutory law and that the
awards may use a sensible reasoning process to interpret the CBAs
without citation to external authority. The data regarding the relatively
low percentage of awards that cite external authority does not upend
Weidemaier’s conclusion, upon his closer look at a subset of the
awards, that “the awards do not remotely resemble what one would
expect from a system of ad hoc, purely discretionary adjudication.”257
A closer analysis and further study are clearly warranted.
B. Attributes of the Arbitration Proceeding that May Affect the Likelihood of
Citation to External Authority
We are aware that some possibly large percentage of labor arbitrators
do not have JDs,258 and that it may be less likely for someone who is not
trained as an attorney to cite external authority. Only one study of
labor arbitration, the Oppenheimer and LaVan study of discrimination
cases from 1979, looked for a correlation between arbitrators having
JDs and citing to external authority, and found that “[w]hether the
arbitrator was a lawyer” was not “significantly related to whether the
arbitrator cited law, judicial decisions, arbitration, or past practice.”259
Our data reflect whether there was a service provider, and, if so,
which provider, for each award. A certain portion of labor arbitrations
are decided by joint grievance boards, an arbitrator named in the
contract, or an arbitrator selected by parties.260 These arbitrators are
more likely to be laypeople with experience in the industry than JDs.261
On the other hand, many labor arbitrations take place under the
auspices of the AAA or the FMCS, and these services are likely to have
a higher number of arbitrators who have JDs on their lists, though not

257. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1121.
258. Picher, Seeber & Lipsky, supra note 49, at 12 (finding 61.4% of NAA arbitrators
in 1999 had a law or JD degree).
259. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 16.
260. See supra Section I.B.
261. See generally Nolan-Haley supra note 46, at 255 n.83.
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all have JDs.262 Our data on service providers can serve as an imprecise
proxy for whether an arbitrator has a JD.263
This section first sets out the data about whether using a service
provider at all or using a particular service provider correlates with
citation to external authority. Second, it examines whether arbitrations
where one or both parties are represented by attorneys are more likely
to result in awards that cite external authority.
1.

Service provider relation to citation to external authority
Overall, the data set contains seventy cases decided by a AAAappointed arbitrator, and eighty-seven cases decided by a FMCSappointed arbitrator. The data set also contains one case decided by a
JAMS-appointed arbitrator, thirty-eight cases decided by a state serviceappointed arbitrator, one court-appointed arbitration, two National
Mediation Board appointed arbitrators, and one arbitrator appointed
by a privately-owned service in Hawaii. The data set contains 402
awards where no service provider is indicated.
Table 1 shows the breakdown of these numbers for service providers
as between cases citing to external authority (a statute, judicial opinion,
or administrative authority) and those citing no external authority.264

262. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1136 n.186.
263. We have all the names of the arbitrators, and a fruitful area for future research
would be to look up each arbitrator and whether they have a JD to test the hypothesis
that those with JDs are more likely to cite external authority.
264. The three partial awards that do not contain any citation to authority in the
portions available are included in this count as citing no external authority.

2020]

ARBITRATORS’ RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY

1867

Table 1
External
Authority
No Service Provider
(n=402)
AAA (n=70)
FMCS (n=87)
JAMS (n=1)
State Service (n=38)
Court
ordered/annexed
(n=1)
National Mediation
Board (n=2)
Dispute Prevention &
Resolution, Inc. (n=1)
Total (n=602)

No External
Authority

47
20
21
1
8

47.47%
20.20%
21.21%
1.01%
8.08%

355
50
66
0
30

70.58%
9.94%
13.12%
0.00%
5.96%

1

1.01%

0

0.00%

1

1.01%

1

0.20%

0
99

0.00%
100.00%

1
503

0.20%
100.00%

Of 503 awards that cite no external authority (statute, judicial
opinion, or administrative authority), 355 awards, approximately
70.58%, are awards with no service provider indicated. In sixty-six of
the awards, approximately 13.12%, the FMCS was used, and in fifty
awards, approximately 9.94%, the AAA was used.
Of the ninety-nine awards that cite to some type of external authority
(statute, judicial opinion, or administrative authority), forty-seven
awards, approximately 47.47%, have no service provider indicated.
Twenty-one awards, approximately 21.21%, are FMCS cases, and
twenty cases, approximately 20.20%, are AAA cases.
The data set has a large proportion of AAA cases and non-AAA cases,
both those that do and do not cite to external authority. It includes
FMCS awards, which, like AAA, has experienced arbitrators on the
roster,265 but it also includes cases where no service provider was used,
which should include some less-experienced arbitrators and joint
265. See Information on Joining the Arbitration Roster, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION
SERV., https://www.fmcs.gov/services/arbitration/information-joining-arbitrator-roster
[https://perma.cc/Q2SH-4Q6C] (requiring arbitrators to submit recent arbitration
award decisions or complete a class to become a FMCS arbitrator); AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA Labor Panel, https://www.adr.org/
sites/default/files/document_repository/Labor_QualificationsCriteria_AAAPanel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3C5-N7V8].
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arbitration boards of non-attorneys who work in the industry, as well as
more experienced arbitrators.
When comparing the seventy AAA awards to the eighty-seven FMCS
awards, we find no statistically significant difference between the rate
at which the awards cite external authority, approximately 28.57% and
24.14% respectively. When comparing the 402 awards in the data base
where no service provider is indicated to those that were authored by
an arbitrator assigned by the AAA or FMCS, we find that a statistically
significant greater number of awards authored by those assigned by
one of the service providers cite to external authority. Only
approximately 11.69% of the awards without a service provider cite to
external authority.
Table 2 reflects the numbers and percentages of awards that do and
do not cite external authority for the cases where no service provider
was indicated in comparison to the cases with AAA-appointed and
FMCS-appointed arbitrators. A two-tailed T-test run on STATA was used
to determine whether the differences were statistically significant for
each of the findings reported in this Article.
Table 2
External Authority

No External
Authority

No Service Provider
(N=402)
47
11.69%
355
88.31%
AAA
(N=70)
20
28.57%
50
71.43%
FMCS
(N=87)
21
24.14%
66
75.86%
Note: There is statistically significant difference in the citation to
external authority between no service provider and AAA (at the 1%
level) and between no service provider and FMCS (at the 1%
level), but there is not a statistically significant difference in the
citation to external authority between AAA and FMCS.
Approximately 30.10% of the awards where no service provider was
used, 121 of 402 awards, were decided by joint boards or similar groups
of industry experts rather than a traditional arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators. Of those 121 awards, fifty-two, approximately 43%, contained
only the award with no opinion or explanation. In contrast, of those 281
awards decided by a neutral arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, only
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eight, approximately 3%, contained only the award with no opinion or
explanation. This difference contributes to the lower likelihood of
citation to external authority in the non-administered cases. Even
when we compare only the 281 awards decided by an arbitrator or a
panel of arbitrators, and exclude the 121 decided by a joint board, the
AAA and FMCS-appointed arbitrators are more likely than those not
appointed by a service provider to cite external authority, as reflected
in Table 3. Forty-five, approximately 16.01% of the awards indicating no
service provider cite to external authority, whereas twenty, approximately
28.57% of the AAA awards, and twenty-one, approximately 24.14% of the
FMCS awards, cite to external authority, reflecting statistically significant
differences.
Table 3
External
Authority
No Service Provider,
Individual or Panel
Arbitrator
(N=281)
AAA
(N=70)

No External
Authority

45

16.01%

236

83.99%

20

28.57%

50

71.43%

FMCS
(N=87)
21
24.14%
66
75.86%
Note: There is statistically significant difference in the citation to
external authority between no service provider using an individual
or panel arbitrator and AAA (at the 5% level) and between no
service provider using an individual or panel arbitrator and FMCS
(at the 1% level).
The higher rate at which AAA and FMCS-appointed arbitrators cite
external authority may reflect that arbitrators with a legal education
are more likely than industry experts and other arbitrators, without a
J.D., to cite external authority. Other possible explanations for the
greater likelihood of citation of external authority in awards indicating
AAA or FMCS were used by the parties are the following. The parties
using service providers are willing to pay more money, indicated by
payment for the service of the provider, and are willing to compensate
representatives and the arbitrator for time spent on legal research. The
joint boards and some other awards where no service provider is
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indicated may be used in situations that are industry and fact-specific
or require a quick decision (such as in hours or days rather than weeks
or months), so that legal authority reasonably is routinely not
considered. The ethical and other requirements for appearing on the
roster of a service provider may mean that those arbitrators are more
likely to cite authority than others not bound by such rules or
qualifications.266
2.

Attorney representation relation to citation to external authority
Common sense suggests that awards resulting from hearings where
attorneys represent one or more parties might contain more external
authority references because attorneys have been trained to cite
authority and regularly do so in administrative proceedings and court.
They therefore are more likely than non-attorneys to cite statutes, case
law, and administrative authority to the arbitrator. One of us, however,
predicted no statistically significant differences based on attorney
representation similar to the finding that legally trained and nonlegally trained arbitrators have no difference in citation practice in
discrimination cases.267 Additionally, a past study found that nonattorneys often effectively represented unions in labor arbitration of
discrimination claims, which indicates they likely persuasively cite
relevant authority.268 The author, who has practiced labor law and read
many labor arbitration awards, believed that human resources officers
and union business representatives are aware of and competently raise
external authority when arguing their cases.269
According to the data, common sense was the better predictor than
extrapolating from prior studies. As shown in Table 4, of the 384
awards where at least one party was represented by an attorney,270
266. See supra note 265.
267. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 16; see also Zirkel, supra note 155, at
41–42 (stating that five awards involving legal authority did not correlate with either
arbitrators or representatives being attorneys).
268. Levinson, supra note 199, at 846 (“The fact that unions pursued approximately
50[%] of these cases without an attorney indicates that union agents do understand
legal claims well enough to pursue them through the grievance and arbitration
processes unassisted.”).
269. Id. at 789; Ariana R. Levinson, U. LOUISVILLE, https://louisville.edu/law/faculty
-staff/faculty-directory/levinson-ariana [https://perma.cc/3LLE-ZYCN].
270. These included cases where representation of the employee or the employer
was coded as representation by in-house counsel, attorney representation by outside
counsel, or attorney representation but indeterminate whether counsel was in-house
or outside counsel.
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eighty-three, approximately 21.61% cited to external authority, whereas
of the 110 awards where no party was represented by an attorney,271
only nine, approximately 8.18%, cited external authority. The difference
is statistically significant, indicating the presence of an attorney does
correlate with citation to external authority.
Table 4
External
Authority

No External
Authority

Attorney
(N=384)
83
21.61%
301
78.39%
No Attorney
(N=110)
9
8.18%
101
91.82%
Note: There is a statistically significant difference in citation to
external authority when an attorney is involved and citation to
external authority when no attorney is involved (at the 1% level).
Prior studies found that parties’ citation to external authority
increases the likelihood that an arbitrator will cite to external
authority. Edwards’ study suggested that, while the large majority of
arbitrators believed in theory that they should not consider external
authority, 97% agreed that they should consider external authority
“when the parties have, by submission, conferred jurisdiction” to do
so.272 In other words, when both parties cite applicable law, then the
arbitrator should consider it. St. Antoine’s survey found that about half
of the arbitrators will cite external law only if the parties have cited
legal authorities.273 The current study builds on these findings and
suggests that parties are more likely to cite to external authority when
they are represented by attorneys, and the likelihood of citation to
external authority by arbitrators thereby increases. Other possibilities
exist; for instance, perhaps arbitrators cite more external authority
when lawyers represent the parties because they believe the lawyers will
be more persuaded by authority or better able to understand it. Or
perhaps lawyers are more likely to represent the parties in types of
cases in which external authority has relevance to the type of dispute.

271. These included cases where representation of both the employee or the
employer was coded as either no attorney representation or no appearance.
272. Edwards, supra note 133, at 79.
273. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189.
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C. Case Type Relation to Citation of External Authority
This section explores whether the type of case affects the likelihood
that arbitrators cite to external authority. First, it discusses whether
cases involving statutory issues are more likely to cite to external
authority. Second, it breaks down cases by type in a more nuanced way
to see if citation to external authority is more likely in certain types of
claims than in others.
1.

Statutory claims relation to citation to external authority
Because, by definition, a statutory claim involves statutory authority
external to the CBA, we predicted that a higher percentage of those
cases that do cite or refer to external authority than of those that do
not would be statutory claims. Of the ninety-nine awards that cite to
external authority, in nine instances, approximately 9.09% of the
awards, a party asserted a statutory claim. Of the 503 awards that do
not cite to external authority, in thirty-six instances, approximately
7.16% of the awards, a party asserts a statutory claim. As expected, the
percent of cases of those that cite external authority where a party
asserted a statutory claim is greater than of those that do not cite
external authority where a party asserted a statutory claim. Surprisingly,
however, the difference is not statistically significant, possibly because
of the small number of statutory claims, totaling forty-five. Arbitrators
addressing statutory claims are probably more likely than those who do
not to cite to external authority.
Arbitrators who are not addressing statutory claims also cite external
authority as demonstrated by the ninety-one out of 100 cases citing
external authority that do not involve a statutory claim. Approximately,
91% of the cases citing external authority do not address a statutory
claim, meaning the large majority of cases citing external authority
involve claims of breach of CBA. This finding indicates that in some
cases arbitrators are citing external authority as persuasive even when
they are not addressing legal claims that depend on external authority.
Table 5 shows the breakdown between the number of cases citing or
referring to external authority that involve statutory and non-statutory
claims, as compared to the breakdown between the number of cases
not citing or referring to external authority that address statutory and
non-statutory claims.274
274. The three partial awards that do not contain any citation to authority in the
portions available are included in the counts for tables in this section as citing no
external authority.
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Table 5
Statutory
Claim
External Authority (N=99)
No External Authority
(N=503)

No Statutory
Claim

9

9.09%

90

90.91%

36

7.16%

467

92.84%

As shown in Table 6, we also examined the number of statutory
claims that cite external authority compared to the number of nonstatutory claims that cite external authority. We reasoned that perhaps
the lack of a statistically significant difference reflected in Table 3
might be because another attribute, other than statutory claim, also
correlated with citation to external authority.
Of the forty-five arbitrations where a party asserted a statutory claim,
nine awards, approximately 20.00%, cite to external authority. Of the
557 cases where a statutory claim was not brought, ninety awards,
approximately 16.61%, cite to external authority. While again, as
expected, external authority is cited more often in arbitrations involving
a statutory claim, the difference is not statistically significant, perhaps
because of the small number of cases citing external authority, or
perhaps because arbitrators are equally likely to cite external authority
in discharge, or some other type of arbitration case, as they are in those
involving statutory claims.
Table 6
External Authority
Statutory Claim
(N=45)
No Statutory Claim
(N=557)

No External
Authority

9

20.00%

36

80.00%

90

16.16%

467

83.84%

Because of the small number of awards addressing a statutory claim
(forty-five), we were unable to ascertain whether or not arbitrators of
different types of statutory claims, such as Title VII versus ERISA, were
more likely to cite external authority. No award citing external
authority involved ERISA, however, and twenty-one of those which cite
no external authority involved ERISA. We would not expect ERISA
cases that involve an employer’s failure to pay into an ERISA-governed
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benefit fund to cite external authority because normally the union or
trust funds need only to prove the failure to pay and the amount owed,
which does not require reliance on authority.275 Indeed, examples in
this data set are several cases where a default arbitration award was
entered by the arbitrator and at least one case where the employer did
not appear, and the arbitrator entered an award based on the evidence
provided by the Labor Management Cooperation Committee. As
shown in Table 7, when we exclude these twenty-one ERISA cases from
the thirty-six awards addressing statutory claims that do not cite
authority, the likelihood of arbitrators citing external authority in cases
involving statutory claims becomes statistically significant, consistent
with our prediction.276
Table 7
External
Authority***
Statutory Claim
(N=24)
No Statutory Claim
(N=557)

No External
Authority***

9

37.50%

15

62.50%

90

16.16%

467

83.84%

Based on this analysis, we conclude, that labor arbitrators more often
cite external authority in cases involving a statutory claim than in those
involving a contractual breach. With a case involving a breach of a
CBA, arbitrators need not cite legal authority because there is no
analogous non-contract claim, particularly because most employees
are employed at will without any contractual protections as to their
conditions of employment. With a case involving a statutory claim,
arbitrators will cite external authority because that type of claim by
definition involves a statute and is a type of claim on which courts and
administrative agencies will have ruled and provided authority. The
analysis also reveals that in a large number of non-statutory cases,
arbitrators are going beyond the necessary analysis to cite external
authority.
275. See James P. Baker & Emily L. Garcia-Yow, ERISA’s New Playground, 28 BENEFITS
L.J. 1, 9 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins., 571 U.S. 99, 108 (2013)) (noting that once an ERISA plan is established,
“the administrator’s duty is to see the plan is ‘maintained pursuant to [that] written
instrument’”).
276. *** Indicates statistically significant difference at the 1% level.
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These findings support Allen and Jennings conclusion that “[i]n the
majority of arbitration cases,” the law has no bearing on the issue and
many arbitrators believe that they should “restrict themselves merely
to examination of the labor agreement.”277 Yet, in ninety of 557 awards
that did not involve a statutory issue, approximately 16.16%, labor
arbitrators cited external authority. That is a significant minority,
supporting the theory of Mittenthal and, more recently, Malin, that
arbitrators must, in some cases, consider external authority.278 The
finding also supports St. Antoine’s findings that:
• About half of the arbitrators will cite external law only if the
parties have cited legal authorities.279
• About 30% of the arbitrators will cite external law, even if the
parties have not, when “it seems especially pertinent.”280
• Almost 60% “would not order a party to violate external law as
part of their award.”281
2.

Type of claims relation to citation of external authority
We also examined whether certain types of claims, although not
statutory, constitute a higher percentage of those cases that do cite to
external authority than of those that do not. One of us expected that
cases dealing with nondiscrimination provisions would be more likely
to cite to external authority than those dealing with the contractually
based right of just cause for discipline, for example. A large body of
law dealing with Title VII and similar state anti-discrimination laws
exists for arbitrators to draw upon;282 whereas there are fewer cases
addressing just cause outside of the labor context, and cause in the
context of breach of individual contracts is less likely to be interpreted
in the same way.283 Cases dealing with seniority provisions might also
277. Allen & Jennings, supra note 173, at 428.
278. Malin, supra note 16, at 14; Mittenthal, supra note 91, at 42.
279. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 190.
282. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 859 (8th ed. 2015).
283. Only two U.S. jurisdictions, Montana and Puerto Rico have a good cause rather
than an at-will default governing employment. See id. (“Montana is unique among the
50 states in its statutory requirement of just cause for termination.”); Fisher Phillips,
Employment Law in Puerto Rico: Employees’ Rights and Employers’ Obligations, CROSS BORDER
EMPLOYER BLOG (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Cross-Border-Em
ployer/Employment-Law-in-Puerto-Rico-Employeese28099-Rights-andEmployerse28099-Obligations [https://perma.cc/5HGP-V3SS] (“Employers in Puerto
Rico are required to have ‘just’ or ‘good cause’ to discharge employees hired for an
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be more likely to cite external authority to the extent that FMLA leave
is implicated.284
As shown in Table 8, overall there were eighty-eight of the ninetynine awards citing external authority that alleged a breach of a CBA,
and 447 of the 503 awards not citing external authority that alleged a
breach of a CBA, for a total of 565 breach of CBA cases in the database.
We specifically coded for whether the breach alleged was a breach of a
just-cause provision, a nondiscrimination provision, or a seniority
provision. (The other awards addressed issues such as non-unit
employees performing work, including subcontracting cases, failure to
pay into a fringe benefit fund, other benefits issues, including leave,
and wages or compensation, including overtime pay.)
Table 8

Collective Bargaining
Agreement Breach
(N=565)
No Collective Bargaining
Agreement Breach
(N=37)

External
Authority
88
15.58%

No External
Authority
477
84.42%

11

26

28.95%

68.42%

Contrary to our expectations, and as shown in Table 9, none of the
cases citing external authority involved a non-discrimination provision,
and only four of those that did not cite external authority involved a
non-discrimination provision. The data does not indicate external
authority is more likely to be cited in breach of nondiscrimination
clause cases than in other cases. Perhaps employees who are able are
electing to bring administrative charges or lawsuits when they are
discriminated against rather than pursuing a grievance for breach of a
non-discrimination clause. Those cases alleging breach of a seniority
clause were also equally likely to cite or not cite external authority, with
three of the eighty-eight cases citing external authority involving a
breach of a seniority provision, and seventeen of the 477 that did not
cite external authority doing so. There was no statistical difference

indefinite period of time . . . .”). Every state has an anti-discrimination law similar to Title
VII. Rothstein, supra note 282, at 194.
284. See Malin & Vonhof, supra note 187, at 234.
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between the approximately 3.41% and 3.56% of awards in these
categories.
As also reflected in Table 9, the cases involving a breach of a justcause provision were actually a greater proportion of the awards citing
external authority than those that did not. One of us had expected the
reverse to be true because a just-cause provision is a contractual
guarantee without a statutory equivalent, unlike a clause such as a nondiscrimination clause for which there are many similar statutory
guarantees of non-discrimination. Most employees are employed atwill,285 so the union CBA guarantees a greater right to job security than
that available to most other employees. Forty-three of the eighty-eight
awards citing external authority, approximately 48.86%, involved a
breach of a just-cause provision, while 165 of the 477 awards that did
not cite external authority, approximately 34.59%, involved a breach
of a just-cause provision. This difference is statistically significant at the
5% level. Perhaps when a discharge is at issue arbitrators are more
likely to cite external authority to buttress the strength of their
decision. In the labor arbitration context, discharge is considered the
equivalent to “capital punishment,” and employers must follow fair
procedures and have a very good reason to discharge an employee, so
arbitrators may wish to explain the outcome extremely thoroughly and
rely on external authority to do so.
Table 9286

External
Authority
(N=88)
No
External
Authority
(N=477)

Just Cause**

Nondiscrimination

Seniority

43

48.86%

0

0.00%

3

3.41%

49

55.68%

165

34.59%

4

0.84%

17

3.56%

310

64.99%

Other

285. See RAY ET AL., supra note 24, at 33–35 (noting that most employees are
employed at will and can be discharged for any reason or no reason at all).
286. The totals in Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 are greater than 565 because some awards
addressing a breach of CBA included multiple claims such as a termination without
just cause and an additional claim.
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We performed additional analyses to be very sure that no correlation
between non-discrimination and seniority cases and citation to
external authority existed. As shown in Table 10, there was also no
statistically significant difference between the rate at which nondiscrimination cases and all other claims of breach of collective bargaining
agreement cite or refer to external authority. There was also no statistically
significant difference between the rate at which seniority cases and all
other claims of breach of collective bargaining agreement cite or refer
to external authority as shown in Table 11.
Table 10
External
Authority
Nondiscrimination
(N=4)
Other Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Breach
(N=565)

No External
Authority

0

0.00%

4

100.00%

88

15.58%

477

84.42%

Table 11
External
Authority
Seniority
(N=20)
Other Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Breach
(N=555)

No External
Authority

3

15.00%

17

85.00%

87

15.68%

468

84.32%

As shown in Table 12, additional analyses confirmed that breach of
just-cause cases are more likely to cite or refer to external authority
than other types of breach of collective bargaining cases. Forty-three of
208 just-cause cases, approximately 20.67%, cite to external authority
while only fifty of 372, approximately 13.44%, of other types of breach
of CBA cases cite to external authority. The difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
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Table 12
External
Authority**

No External
Authority**

Just Cause
(N=208)
43
20.67%
165
79.33%
Other Collective
Bargaining
Agreement Breach
(N=372)
50
13.44%
322
86.56%
Note: the difference between citation to external authority
between just-cause cases and other CBA cases is significant at the
5% level.
We coded for cases that involved an adverse action, where an
employee was punished, terminated, suspended, laid off, forced to
resign, not promoted, not accommodated, not hired, or denied
something to which the employee was entitled. Combined, these totaled
399 of the 602 awards. Seventy-five of the ninety-nine awards that cite
external authority involved an adverse action. Of the awards that do
not cite external authority, 324 of the 503 involved an adverse action.
We expected a greater percentage of cases citing external authority
would involve harassment and refusals to accommodate. There is a
wide array of statutory and case law, from Title VII, the ADA, and
similar state laws, that can be drawn upon to help determine when
harassment and refusals to accommodate are unlawful. Yet, as shown
in Table 13, only one of the seventy-five cases citing external authority
addressed harassment and only two addressed refusal to accommodate,
approximately 1.33% and 1.85% respectively, of the total awards citing
external authority. Six of the awards that cite no authority involved
harassment, approximately 1.85%, and ten involved a refusal to
accommodate, approximately 3.09%. These differences were not
statistically significant, suggesting that these case types do not
determine whether arbitrators cite external authority.
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Table 13

External Authority
(N=75)
No External Authority
(N=324)

Harassment

Refusal to
Accommodate

1

1.33%

2

2.67%

6

1.85%

10

3.09%

We performed further analyses which confirmed that there is no
correlation between either harassment cases or refusal to accommodate
and citation or reference to external authority. As shown in Table 14,
there is no statistically significant difference between the rate at which
harassment cases, approximately 14.29%, and all other adverse action
cases, approximately 18.80%, cite or refer to external authority.
Similarly, as shown in Table 15, there is no statistically significant
difference between the rate at which refusal to accommodate cases,
approximately 16.67%, and all other adverse action cases, approximately
18.69%, cite or refer to external authority.
Table 14
External
Authority
Harassment Alleged
(N=7)
Other Adverse Action
Alleged
(N=399)

No External
Authority

1

14.29%

6

85.71%

75

18.80%

324

81.20%

Table 15
External
Authority
Refusal to
Accommodate Alleged
(N=12)
Other Adverse Action
Alleged (N=396)

No External
Authority

2

16.67%

10

83.33%

74

18.69%

322

81.31%

2020]

ARBITRATORS’ RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY

1881

CONCLUSION
This Article describes how we have amassed a new data set of labor
arbitration awards drawn from the PACER database.287 Any subset of
arbitration awards is not representative because the very nature of
arbitration is that it is a private alternative to litigation. Unlike court
documents, which are tracked and publicly available, an award is often
simply sent to the parties, and so is not tracked in any manner and
certainly not publicly available. Even the awards tracked by service
providers like the AAA are not publicly available, and a researcher
must obtain permission from the AAA to view the awards. Our new data
set provides an opportunity to analyze hundreds of awards that are not
selected from BNA published awards as most prior data sets exploring
citation to external authority in labor arbitration awards have been.288
We have examined the awards to contribute to a long-standing debate
over whether arbitrators do and should consider authority external to
the CBA when deciding labor grievances.289 By extension, the
examination of the data also bears on the larger and often-debated
issue of whether arbitration is “lawless.”290
The data demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of awards do
not cite to external authority, but only a small number of awards
explicitly decline to address a statutory issue or do not address a
statutory issue raised in the award in passing or by one of the parties.291
In our data set, the largest number of awards that cite no external
authority, and over 45% of those that do cite external authority, result
from processes not administered by a service provider.292 We find that
using the AAA or FMCS correlates with a greater likelihood of awards
citing to or referencing external authority than awards that results
from a non-administrated process.293 We also find that representation,
of one or both parties, by an attorney correlates with a greater
likelihood of awards citing to or referencing external authority.294
After extensive analysis, we find the data demonstrates, as
anticipated, that awards that address a statutory claim are more likely

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra Section IV.
See supra Section II.E.
See supra Section III.
We address this issue in future articles.
See supra Section IV.A.1, 5.
See supra Section IV.B.1.
See supra Section IV.B.1.
See supra Section IV.B.2.
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than those that do not to cite to or reference external authority.295 The
data also indicates that awards addressing claims asserting a breach of
a just-cause provision are more likely than other types of contractual
claims to cite to external authority.296 While this result was surprising
to one of us, one author expected this result, because “just cause” is a
rather vague term that can benefit from external meaning and
guidance.
In short, our study indicates that labor arbitrators often do not
consult external authority. That said, reliance on external authority
shows mild indications of nuance, and some factors are more likely to
cause arbitrators to cite legal authority than others. Perhaps this
nuance reflects the views of those scholars who believe that today’s
labor arbitration does not enable or justify the total exclusion of
external authority. It does seem, though, that Howlett’s views have, to
date, not been fully embraced in the arbitration context we study here.
The new data set will provide an opportunity to examine many other
issues raised by labor arbitration and more generally by arbitration,
such as whether there is a repeat-player effect, whether attorney
representation affects win rates, and whether the arbitrator’s and
parties’ gender affects win rates. We will soon publish a second article
exploring further the issues the data set raises about potential
“lawlessness” in labor arbitration. Thereafter, we plan to write two
articles that focus on the use of “precedent”—previous labor arbitration
awards—in labor arbitration, and the connection between citation to
authority and treatment of the awards by the courts.

295. See supra Section IV.C.1.
296. See supra Section IV.C.2.

